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Corporate/Securities Lawyers: Disclosure,
Responsibility, Liability to Investors, and
National Student Marketing Corp.
Samuel H. Gruenbaum*
I. Introduction
Over the past several years, a considerable amount of concern has attended
the matter of lawyers' liability and responsibility under the federal securities laws
in connection with transactions and activities of clients.' The level of concern
heightened significantly in 1972 when the Securities and Exchange Commission
(hereinafter referred to as SEC or Commission) filed its complaint in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp.' Among other things, the complaint alleged
that two large law firms and various individuals who were partners in the firms,
committed violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws by
failing to disclose to the SEC certain information relating to the merger of their
clients-National Student Marketing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
NSMC) and Interstate National Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Inter-
state). Less than two weeks after the complaint was filed, the Wall Street
Journal reported that it had become "the best-read document since Gone With
the Wind."
3
The SEC's allegations added a new dimension to the issues concerning
lawyers' liability and responsibility. For the first time it was alleged that lawyers
* B.S. 1973, California State University, Northridge; J.D. 1977, Loyola University School
of Law at Los Angeles; LL.M. Candidate 1979, Georgetown University Law Center. Member,
California Bar; Certified Public Accountant, California Board member. Formerly an attorney
with the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility
for any private publication by any of its members or employees. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or its staff.
While on the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the author was not involved
in the litigation referred to in this article. Finally, nothing contained herein, other than the
views of the author, was obtained from sources which are not a matter of public record.
1 For extensive citations to law review articles and other commentaries on the subject,
see Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-The Lawyer's Dilemma,
33 Bus. LAw. 1389, 1404-05 n.38 (1978); Sonde, Professional Responsibility-A New Re-
ligion, or the Old Gospel, 24 EMoRY L. J. 827, 827-28 n.6 (1975).
2 SEC. v. National Student Mkting. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1[ 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972).
As the district court noted in its discussion concerning the lawyers' liability:
The filing of the complaint in this proceeding generated significant interest and an
almost overwhelming amount of comment within the legal profession on the scope of
a securities lawyer's obligations to his client and to the investing public. The very
initiation of this action, therefore, has provided a necessary and worthwhile impetus
for the profession's recognition and assessment of its responsibilities in this area.
SEC v. National Student Mkting. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 714 (D.D.C. 1978).
3 Green, Irate Attorneys-A Bid to Hold Lawyers Accountable to Public Stuns, Angers
Firms, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1. More recently, the New York Times featured
an article highlighting many of thd conflicting considerations confronting lawyers in determin-
ing their obligations to corporate clients as opposed to the investing public. The article
pointed out the divergence in views within the legal profession on the issues involved, and
made it clear that resolution of the issues was a matter of great importance. Miller, What a
Lawyer Owes His Client-A.B.A., S.E.C. Study Changes in Corporate Law Standards, New
York Times, Dec. 17, 1978, § F., at 1, col. 5.
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acting in their professional capacities violated the federal securities laws by failing
to stop their clients' transaction, and, failing that, to inform the SEC that the
clients had made materially misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials
distributed to their shareholders. In August 1978, the district court held that
the lawyers had aided and abetted violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws.' The decision has been appealed.'
The issues underlying attorneys' liability and responsibility under the federal
securities laws with respect to the activities of their clients are complex and often
perplexing. This perplexity can be traced in part to confusion concerning the
ethical and legal principles involved in analyzing these issues. This article will
explore and clarify these principles generally, and apply them to the facts of
National Student Marketing Corp. In the final analysis, a proper account of the
principles will help define the contours of lawyers' responsibility and liability in
this area of the law.
II. National Student Marketing Corp.-The Facts
During June 1969, representatives of NSMC and Interstate reached an
agreement in principle for the merger of their corporations. Each was a publicly
held company, and the merger was to be accomplished through a public ex-
change of NSMC stock for all of Interstate's outstanding stock. After extensive
negotiations, a merger agreement was entered into between the two parties.
The agreement provided for mutual and parallel provisions as to such
matters as warranties and representations, a comfort letter from independent
accountants, and counsel opinion letters concerning legal aspects of the merger.6
The agreement also contained conditions precedent to the consummation of the
merger. In particular, the agreement required Interstate's counsel to deliver an
opinion letter to NSMC concerning legal aspects of the merger,' and NSMC's
independent public accountants to deliver a comfort letter to Interstate.' The
4 457 F. Supp. at 715. The Commission made little effort to distinguish between
principals and aiders and abettors in its charges against the defendants. The district court,
recognizing that the distinction may be dwindling in light of recent developments, nonethe-
less characterized the charges against the attorney defendants as aiding and abetting. In this
regard, the charges fell into four categories:
(1) the failure of the attorney defendants to take any action to interfere in the
consummation of the merger;
(2) the issuance by the attorneys of an opinion with respect to the merger;
(3) the attorneys' subsequent failure to withdraw that opinion and inform the
Interstate shareholders or the SEC of the inaccuracy of the nine-month financials
[which were included in the proxy soliciting materials]; and
(4) the issuance by the attorneys .. . of an opinion . .. concerning the validity of
[certain stock sales by officers of Interstate during the week following the merger].
457 F. Supp. at 700, 712. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Note Rule 10b-5 Liability After
Hochfelder: Abandoning the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CHI. L. Rav. 218 (1977).
The court in National Student Mkting Corp. concurred with the Commission's allega-
tions concerning the attorneys' failure to interfere in the consummation of the merger, but
concluded that the remaining charges did not by themselves substantially facilitate the
violation and therefore did not amount to aiding and abetting. 457 F. Supp. at 712.
5 457 F. Supp. 682, appeals pending, Nos. 1052-54 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
6 457 F. Supp. at 689.
7 Id. at 690. Similarly, NSMC's counsel was required to deliver such an opinion letter
to Interstate.
8 Id. Similarly, Interstate's independent public accountants were required to deliver a
comfort letter to NSMC. Both NSMC and Interstate utilized the same independent public
[June 19791
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accountants' comfort letter was to cover NSMC's interim financial statements as
of and for the nine-month period ending May 31, 1969. Finally, the agreement
provided that notwithstanding any stockholder vote of approval of the agree-
ment, the board of directors of each corporation could waive any of the condi-
tions precedent to the respective corporation's obligations.
Both corporations utilized proxy statements to secure shareholder approval
of the merger.' Interstate's proxy materials included NSMC's proxy statement
and a copy of the merger agreement. NSMC's proxy statement contained
NSMC's financial statements as of and for the nine-month period ending May
31, 1969. Interstate urged its shareholders to carefully consider NSMC's proxy
statement as such information was "important to [the shareholders'] considera-
tion of the proposed merger."'
The closing meeting took place in New York on the afternoon of October
31, 1969, at NSMC's counsels' law offices. The meeting commenced, but the
comfort letter from NSMG's independent accountants had not arrived. One of
NSMC's lawyers telephoned the accountants and inquired about the letter. The
accountants proceeded to dictate it over the telephone to a secretary who then
typed it out. The letter stated that significant adjustments totalling $884,000
were required in NSMG's income statement for the nine-month period ending
May 31, 1969, thus reducing NSMC's previously reported net income of
$700,000 to a loss of $184,000." A copy of the typed letter was delivered to the
conference room where the closing was taking place. The two members of the
law firm representing Interstate" read the unsigned letter, as did Interstate's
president and chief executive officer. The NSMC representatives were then asked
several questions concerning the adjustments, and they gave their assurances that
the adjustments would not have a significant effect on NSMC's predicted year-
end earnings, and that a substantial portion of the adjustments would be re-
covered.
Viewing the letter as a serious matter, and the adjustments contained therein
as significant and important, the Interstate representatives and Interstate's
counsel conferred privately to consider their alternatives. Resolicitation of Inter-
state's shareholders was considered, but rejected since it was felt that any alter-
native which would delay the merger would probably result in an extension of
time to a point beyond the merger upset date of November 28, 1969." Inter-
state's president and chief executive officer asked one of Interstate's lawyers
whether the merger could proceed on the basis of an unsigned comfort letter,
and the lawyer responded that it could. The parties then exchanged various docu-
accounting firm.
9 Both corporations represented and warranted that the information, including the finan-
cial statements contained in their respective proxy statements, was true and correct. Id. at 689.
10 Id. at 690.
11 The accountants delivered a signed comfort letter the following Monday, November 3,
1969, which reduced the total adjustments to $784,000, thus reducing the loss after the
adjustments to $84,000. Id. at 696.
12 One of the members of this law firm was also a director of Interstate. Id. at 688.
13 The merger agreement required that the merger be consummated on or before Novem-
ber 28, 1969. Id. at 690.
Among the alternatives considered were: (1) delaying or postponing the closing, either
to secure more information or to resolicit the shareholders with corrected financials; (2) clos-
ing the merger; or (3) calling it off completely. Id. at 694.
[Vol. 54: 795]
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ments necessary to close the merger transaction, including an opinion letter from
Interstate's lawyer concerning the legal aspects of the merger and the closing was
consummated.
The upheaval which resulted in the legal profession from the filing of Na-
tional Student Marketing Corp. stemmed from paragraph 48(i) of the com-
plaint. The SEC alleged:
[Als part of the fraudulent scheme [Interstate's counsel] . . . failed to refuse
to issue their opinions . . . and failed to insist that the financial statements
be revised and shareholders be resolicited, and failing that, to cease repre-
senting their respective clients and under the circumstances, notify the
plaintiff Commission concerning the misleading nature of the nine-month
financial statements.14
This contention has appeal considering the critical importance of the lawyers'
advice and opinion to the consummation of the merger transaction. It is the
significance of the lawyers' role in securities transactions which lends appeal to a
claim such as that made by the SEC.
III. The Role of Lawyers in Securities Transactions
Lawyers play an essential role in securities matters. As former Commis-
sioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., stated:
In a word, and the word is Professor Morgan Shipman's, the professional
judgment of the attorney is often the "pass key" to securities transactions.
If he gives an opinion that an exemption is available, securities get sold;
if he doesn't give the opinion, they don't get sold. If he judges that certain
information must be included in a registration statement, it gets included
(unless the client seeks other counsel or the attorney crumbles under the
weight of client pressure) ; if he concludes it need not be included, it doesn't
get included. 5
14 SEC v. National Student Mkting. Corp. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) f 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972).
The SEC initially filed its action against several other parties, including NSMC's counsel.
By the time the district court rendered its opinion in National Student Mkting. Corp. in
August 1978, the cases against all of the parties, except Interstate's president, the law firm
which acted as outside counsel to Interstate and two of its partners, had been disposed of.
457 F. Supp. at 686-87.
15 Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1974] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 79,631, p. 83,689.
It has been suggested that the extremely broad participation of lawyers in the disclosure
process under the federal securities laws resulted from the apprehension of civil liability by
issuers, corporate officers, directors, underwriters and experts. Cooney, The Registration Process:
The Role of the Lawyer in Disclosure, 33 Bus. LAW. 1329, 1329-31 (Special Issue March
1978). Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability on such persons for material
misstatements or omissions contained in registration statements filed with the Commission,
which have become effective. While Section 11 contains provisions for what is commonly
referred to as a "due diligence" defense to a charge of liability, the issuer (registrant) has
absolute liability under the section for material misstatements or omissions. The parameters
of due diligence were dealt with extensively in the landmark cases of Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Lower courts have held that an implied private cause of action for damages exists under
§ 17(a) (general anti-fraud) of the Securities Act of 1933. Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank
[June 1979]
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Once this "pass key" is obtained from the lawyer, millions of dollars change
hands, securities are distributed to the investing public, and changes in corporate
ownership and control take place. Millions of individuals are affected by these
events. Most of the time, however, such individuals are in no position to in-
fluence the structure, terms, conditions or any other aspect of the events.
As a result, protection of the individuals' interests must come from the
corporations, if it is to come at all. The federal securities laws were enacted to
effectuate this end. One commentator characterized such laws as "the first fed-
eral consumer legislation."' 6 Since corporations must be sensitive to the interests
of their shareholders, so must legal advisers be sensitive to these interests when
rendering advice and issuing opinions to the corporations. Lawyers' obligations
to the interests of their clients dictate that they be cognizant of their clients'
responsibilities to others. Moreover, the important and substantial nature of
lawyers' involvement in the securities affairs of corporate clients is strong reason
for insisting upon a keen sensitivity to shareholders' interests."
It must be emphasized that the pertinent issues addressed here concern
lawyers acting as advisers, not lawyers involved in litigation or otherwise acting
as advocates. Although lawyers' responsibilities are often understood from the
perspective of the lawyer as an advocate, the vast changes which have occurred in
of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1975); Globus v. Law Research Serv.,
Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-84 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). However,
the Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of whether such a cause of action
exists. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, . U.S. 47 U.S. L. W. 4135, 4136
n.9 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.6 (1975).
Similarly, the breadth of liability for material misstatements or omissions in periodic
reports typically filed with the Commission or disseminated to shareholders under the pro-
visions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides an impetus for a high degree of
involvement by lawyers in the preparation of such reports. See § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 (general
anti-fraud, § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 (false and misleading statements in proxies), § 14(e)
(anti-fraud in connection with tender offers), and § 18(a) (false and misleading statements
in any application, report, or document filed with the Commission pursuant to the provisions
of the Exchange Act or the rules and regulations thereunder). An implied private cause of
action for damages exists under §§ "10(b) and 14(a) of the Exchange Act. Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1974) ; Under § 14(e) a defeated tender offeror has no such cause of action, but the
question remains open with respect to tender offerees and others. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977). An express private cause of action for damages is provided
for in § 18(a) of the Exchange Act.
16 Sommer, supra note 15.
17 Criticism of the legal profession's shortcomings in this regard was echoed as early as
1934, when former Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas stated:
All of [the regulatory] measures, of course, merely check on control rather than cure
a fundamental condition which underlies the whole problem. The condition has
been reflected by the amazing absence of social consciousness on the part of directors
and business executives and by their lack of any awareness of the implications and
results of many practices which flourished in recent years. It has not been so much
a matter of depravity and of evil intent as the consequence of cutting as close to the
mythical legal line as possible. This lack of social mindedness has not been wholly or
largely that of business. It has been equally shared by lawyers. It has been evidenced
by the almost perverted singleness of purpose with which they have championed the
cause of their clients, whether it be in the drafting of a deposit agreement, the
handling of a merger, the conduct of a reorganization, or the marketing of securities.
It resulted in getting accomplished what clients wanted but without regard for the
long-term consequences of those accomplishments. That singleness of purpose has
been wholly incompatible with the use of these aggregations of capital for either
the welfare of the investors or the good of the public.
Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REV. 1305, 1328-29 (1934).
[Vol. 54: 795]
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our society dictate a change in perspective."8 Today's lawyer, in particular the
corporate securities lawyer, plays the role of adviser far more than the role of
advocate. It is imperative that lawyers' responsibilities be reexamined in light
of this changed role. In the words of former Supreme Court Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone:
Before [the Bar] can function at all as the guardian of public interests com-
mitted to its care, there must be appraisal and comprehension of the new
conditions and the changed relationships of the lawyer to his clients, to his
professional brethren and the public. That appraisal must pass beyond the
petty details of form and manners which have been so largely the subject
of our codes of ethics, to more fundamental consideration of the way in
which our professional activities affect the welfare of society as a whole.
Our canons of ethics for the most part are generalizations designed for an
earlier era. 19
A. The Role of Lawyers as Advisers
The role of a legal adviser is fundamentally different from the role of an
advocate. The Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter referred to as
CPR), as adopted by the American Bar Association (hereinafter referred to as
ABA) effective January 1, 1970, distinguishes between the responsibilities of a
lawyer acting in these different capacities. 2' As an advocate, a lawyer generally
deals with past conduct." The CPR instructs an advocate to resolve doubts in
favor of his client,2 2 and to "urge any permissible construction of the law
favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to the likeli-
hood that the construction will ultimately prevail."2 3 As an advocate, a lawyer's
"conduct is within the bounds of the law, and therefore permissible, if the posi-
tion taken is supported by the law or is supportable by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of the law."
24
An adviser usually assists in determining future conduct and relationships.
In this regard, the CPR urges an adviser to give his opinion as to what he believes
the decisions of the courts would likely be based on applicable law,2  and how
such decisions would legally and practically affect the matter at hand.2 6 More-
over, an adviser may withdraw from the representation if his client chooses to
proceed contrary to his judgment and advice, even if the client's contemplated
18 See Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public Interest, and Professional
Ethics, 76 MicH. L. Rav. 425 (1978).
19 Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. Ryv. 1, 10 '(1934).
20 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIasLITY EC 7-3, 7-4 and 7-5.
The CPR also states: "Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer
may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or adviser. A lawyer may serve simul-
taneously as both advocate and adviser, but the two roles are essentially different." EC 7-3.
21 Id. EC 7-3.
22 Id.
23 EC 7-4.
The lawyer . . . is not an. umpire, but an advocate. He is under no duty to refrain
from making every proper argument in support of any legal point because he is not
convinced of its inherent soundness .... His personal belief in the soundness of his
cause or of the authorities supporting it, is irrelevant.






conduct is within the bounds of the law.17 An advocate is not as free to with-
draw.
28
Thus, an adviser's responsibilities require him to give broad consideration to
the implications of the various interests which will be affected by his client's con-
templated conduct. This broad perspective may well include the public interest.
As one commentator explained:
Today's lawyers perform two distinct types of functions [the functions of
counselor and advocate], and our ethical standards should, but in the main
do not, recognize these two functions....
[T]he ethical standards to be applied to the counselor.., should require a
greater recognition and protection for the interest of the public generally
than is presently expressed in the canons. Also, the counselor's obligation
should extend to requiring him to inform and to impress upon the client a
just solution of the problem, considering all interests involved.
2 9
The obligation to recognize and consider interests beyond those of the client
will, in the case of a corporate client, require the adviser to focus on how the
corporation's contemplated conduct will affect its shareholders. In the final
analysis, the beneficiaries of such a practice should be both the corporation and
its shareholders. Clearly, corporations have a strong interest in promoting the
interests of their shareholders and, therefore, the adviser's perceptions and crit-
icisms of how any contemplated conduct will affect such shareholders should
be made with the objective of furthering this end.
Thus, lawyers advising corporate clients are not free to ignore the share-
holders' interests, despite the rubric of unquestioned devotion and loyalty to the
"client."2 " The lawyer's responsibility to society2" requires him to consider and
27 EC 7-8. An adviser must have a greater sense of propriety and fairness as to the effects
of his client's conduct on others:
The man who has been called into court to answer for his own actions is entitled to
a fair hearing. Partisan advocacy plays its essential part in such a hearing, and the
lawyer pleading his client's case may properly present it in the most favorable light.
A similar resolution of doubts in one direction becomes inappropriate when the
lawyer acts as counselor. The reasons that justify and even require partisan ad-
vocacy in the trial of a cause do not grant any license to the lawyer to participate
as legal adviser in a line of conduct that is immoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality.
In saving himself from this unworthy involvement, the lawyer cannot be guided
solely by an unreflective inner sense of good faith; he must be at pains to preserve
a sufficient detachment from his client's interests so that he remains capable of a
sound and objective appraisal of the propriety of what his client proposes to do.
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1161 (1958)
(cited in EC 7-3 n.9).
28 EC 7-8.
29 Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. Rav. 575, 578-79 (1961)
(cited in EC 7-3 n.9). Other commentators, however, have rejected the proposition that a
lawyer's responsibilities differ depending on the posture of his representation. See, e.g.,
Freedman, Professional Responsibility in Securities Regulation, N.Y.L.J., April 24, 1974, at 4,
col. 3.
30 See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 1977)
(client had absolute right to undivided loyalty of law firm which client had retained); Udall
v. Littell, 366 F.2d 668, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 '(1967) ("an
attorney ... is bound to the highest duty of fidelity, honor, fair dealing and full disclosure to
a client"). See also 567 F.2d at 233 n.16; Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384,
1386 (2d Cir. 1976); Hafter v. Farkas, 498 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1974) (lawyer's duty to




speak out on what he perceives the consequences of his client's contemplated
conduct will be on its shareholders.
It has been pointed out that most of the SEC's proceedings against lawyers
have involved lawyers acting as advisers, rather than as advocates.
2 The Com-
mission has repeatedly emphasized that advisers and advocates have different
responsibilities under the federal securities laws. In In re Emanuel Fields, the
Commission said:
Very little of a securities lawyer's work is adversary in character. He doesn't
work in courtrooms where the pressure of vigilant adversaries and alert
judges checks him. He works in his office where he prepares prospectuses,
proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our
staff, the financial community, and the investing public must take on faith."
One year after the Fields case, in In re Arthur Andersen & Co., the Com-
mission again spoke about the role of advisers in securities matters:
Professionals involved in the disclosure process are in a very real sense rep-
resentatives of the investing public served by the Commission, and, as a
result, their dealings with the Commission and its staff must be permeated
with candor and full disclosure. It cannot resemble an adversary relation-
ship more appropriate to litigants in court, because the Commission is not
an adverse party in this context.'
4
A literal reading of this statement limits its scope to professionals' duty of "can-
dor and full disclosure" to the Commission and its staff. However, considering
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the
law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and
loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires
of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) and EC 4-1.
31 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble. It may even be that a lawyer's
responsibility to society as envisioned by the CPR makes it inappropriate to limit his obligations
to the client's shareholders in the case of a corporate client. There may be an obligation to
recognize and consider the interests of the public at large.
32 Sonde, supra note 1, at 836.
33 In re Emanuel Fields, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,407, p. 83,174-75 n.20 (1973).
Fields, a lawyer, had been enjoined from violations of the registration and anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws on four separate occasions. The Commission instituted
non-public administrative proceedings against him pursuant to SEC Rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R. §
201.2(e) '(1978), of its Rules of Practice, and, after a hearing, barred him from practice
before it. Fields challenged the Commission's disciplinary authority under Rule 2(e), and
the court of appeals affirmed the Commission's action. Fields v. SEC, No. 73-1722 (D.C. Cir.
order dated April 15, 1974).
Under Rule 2 (e), the Commission has the authority to discipline professionals who practice
before it. This authority is limited to cases involving professionals who (1) do not possess the
requisite qualifications to appear or practice before the Commission in the representation of
others; (2) are lacking in character or integrity; (3) have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct; or (4) have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted violations of,
the provisions of the Securities Acts. Rule 2(e) proceedings have, with rare exception, been
adjudicated privately, rather than publicly. See In re Touche Ross & Co., FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) f 80,720 (1976) (order for public proceedings against proceedings against public
accounting firm).
34 In re Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
ff 79,900, p. 84,263 (1974). But see American Fin. Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962),
where the Commission said, "Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting as
the client's advisor, defender, advocate and confidant enters into a personal relationship in
which his principal concern is with the interests and rights of his client."
[June 1979]
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the statement that "[p]rofessionals involved in the disclosure process are . . .
representatives of the investing public served by the Commission," it is clear
that the duty of "candor and full disclosure" was also meant with reference to
the investing public.
The SEC's position seems to be buttressed on the lawyer-adviser's role as
a participant in the decision-making process in securities matters. Here the
lawyer-adviser does more than merely counsel on the technicalities of the law.
The regulation of securities mattefs is so comprehensive that the lawyer must
advise on every aspect of a contemplated transaction. The lawyer's advice can
affect who may buy and sell, the prices at which transactions may be effected,
when transactions may be effected, and where transactions may be effected. So
broad is the reach of a lawyer's advice in securities matters, and so necessary is
his involvement, that he thereby becomes a participant in the matter, and must
assume a direct responsibility to those who will be affected by it. 5 As former
Commissioner Sommer claimed:
Consequently, I would suggest that all the old verities and truisms about
attorneys and their roles are in question and in jeopardy-and, unless you
are ineradicably dedicated to the preservation of thepast, that is not all bad.
I would suggest that in securities matters (other than those where advocacy
is clearly proper) the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin
to that of the auditor than to that of the advocate. This means several
things. . . . It means he will have to be acutely cognizant of his responsi-
bility to the public who engage in securities transactions that would never
have come about were it not for his professional presence? 6
In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., the Second Circuit expressed its view on the role
of advisers under the federal securities laws:
The securities laws provide a myriad of safeguards designed to protect the
interests of the investing public. Effective implementation of these safe-
guards, however, depends in large measure on the members of the bar who
serve in an advisory capacity to those engaged in securities transactions.
3 7
35 As former Supreme Court Justice Stone stated:
We must remember, nevertheless, that the very conditions which have caused
specialization, which have drawn so heavily upon the technical proficiency of the Bar,
have likewise placed it in a position where the possibilities of its influence are almost
beyond calculation .... Without the constant advice and guidance of lawyers business
would come to an abrupt halt. And whatever standards of conduct in the perform-
ance of its function the Bar consciously adopts must at once be reflected in the char-
acter of the world of business and finance. Given a measure of self-conscious and
cohesive professional unity, the Bar may exert a power more beneficient and far-
reaching than it or any other non-governmental group has wielded in the past.
Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1934).
36 Sommer, supra note 15, at p. 83,689-90.
Recently, Chairman Harold M. Williams had occasion to comment on the role of advisers
and advocates:
As an advocate-e.g., in the courtroom--except in unusual situations, his [the
lawyer's] job is to vindicate the client's position, to justify what the client did in the
past or wishes to do in the future. In the advisor capacity, however, the lawyer's
role is different. It is there that he has the opportunity to bring considerations of
both ethics and law to bear on the corporation's future conduct.
Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer's Role, 34 Bus. LAw. 7, 13 (1978).
37 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973).
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The underlying rationale for this position would appear to be the necessarily high
degree of involvement of advisers in the securities transactions of their clients.
Similarly, in the disclosure process, advisers play a very important role by reason
of their influence over what is and is not disclosed by their clients.3" As Judge
Gessell recently stated, "[E]very businessman must rely to some extent on the
advice of outside counsel and auditors as to the appropriate contents of filings with
the SEC." 9 Investors rely on this process. It is the only practical means of afford-
ing them the protections which were intended by the federal securities laws." As
Professor Mundheim stated it:
The point that is being raised is that, under certain theories developing
under the securities laws, people are beginning to develop expectations that
as a matter of law lawyers have responsibility to look out for people who
have not traditionally been viewed as their clients....
As the securities law develops to impose obligations on a lawyer for the
issuer to have responsibility for the investors in a public offering, expec-
tations are created with respect to the conduct of lawyers for the issuer.4'
B. Legal Opinions and Participation in the Disclosure Process
Legal opinions play an important part in a large variety of securities
transactions. They are required by law in registration statements filed with
the SEC4 2 and are frequently sought in securities transactions which do not
require the filing of reports with governmental bodies but which involve im-
portant questions concerning compliance with the securities laws. 3 Even when
opinions are not absolutely required, as a matter of practice and good sense they
are obtained. Doubtlessly, few transactions would proceed with adverse legal
opinions. A legal opinion is frequently the red or green light to the consumma-
tion of a securities transaction.
In United States v. Benjamin,44 Judge Friendly addressed the matter of
professionals' exposure to criminal liability for opinions rendered in securities
transactions:
In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion
can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel
or the crowbar. Of course, Congress did not mean that any mistake of law
38 Id. See Cooney, supra note 15.
39 SEC v. S. Hayward Wills, No. 77-0097 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 1978).
40 See Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Van Dusen, Jr.,
Ethics and Specialized Practice-An Overview of the Momentum for Reexamination, 33 Bus.
LAW. 1565, 1568 (Special Issue March 1978).
41 Discussion by Participants and Panel, Relations with Management and Individual
Financial Interests, 33 Bus. LAW. 1227, 1250-51 (Special Issue March 1978) (comments of
Professor Robert H. Mundheim).
42 See Item '(23) of Schedule A under the Securities Act (counsel must opine on the
legality of the securities being registered).
43 Some examples include legal opinions concerning the unregistered distribution of
securities, the use of a statutory prospectus and the sale of "control" stock pursuant to the
rules under the Securities Act. See also note 15 supra.
44 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
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or misstatement of fact should subject an attorney or an accountant to crim-
inal liability simply because more skillful practitioners would not have made
them. But Congress equally could not have intended that men holding
themselves out as members of these ancient professions should be able to
escape criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut their
eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have represented a knowledge they
knew they did not possess.4"
Benjamin strongly suggests that a lawyer may not proceed blindly in ren-
dering his opinion, but instead must carefully scrutinize the facts and circum-
stances before him. Such requirements are, of course, a means of achieving the
desired goal of protecting the investing public.
In National Student Marketing Corp., the SEC argued that under Ben-
jamin the lawyers' failure to refuse to issue their legal opinion upon receipt of
the unsigned comfort letter from the accountants constituted a violation of the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.46 The court ruled that the
legal opinion did not substantially assist the violations alleged and therefore
could not be considered to have aided and abetted the violations. However,
had the lawyers refused to issue their opinion, it must seriously be doubted
whether the merger would have proceeded to close. The Interstate representa-
tives and lawyers appreciated that the information contained in the comfort
letter was "significant" and "important."4 7 Doubtless, a refusal by the lawyers
to issue their opinion as a result of the comfort letter would have substantially
affected the decision of the Interstate representatives to proceed with the merger.
Moreover, liability should have resulted from the issuance of the opinion letter
since, unlike the lawyer in Benjamin who pleaded ignorance of the facts, the
lawyers in National Student Marketing Corp. admitted knowledge of the rele-
vant facts.
In SEC v. Frank," the Second Circuit dealt with a lawyer who had been
found to have violated the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws
as a result of his participation in the preparation of a misleading offering circular
which had been used to sell stock in a public offering. The defendant argued
against the district court's findings on the basis that the misleading portion of
the offering circular had been prepared by the officers of the issuer "and that his
function had been that of a scrivener helping them to place their ideas in proper
form."" Judge Friendly responded by reiterating his admonition in Benjamin
concerning the importance of accountants' certificates and lawyers' opinions."0
Judge Friendly added:
A lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with regard to
45 Id. at 863.
46 SEC Post-Trial Brief at 150, SEC v. National Student Mkting Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682
(D.D.C. 1978). The court in National Student Mkting. Corp. did not address the Benjamin
case.
47 457 F. Supp. at 694. Indeed, upon receipt of the unsigned letter, both counsel for and
the representatives of Interstate caucussed privately to consider their alternatives in light of
the significance of the information contained in the letter. See text accompanying note 12
supra.
48 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
49 Id. at 488.
50 328 F.2d at 863.
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securities which he knows to be false simply because his client has furnished
it to him .... [A] lawyer, no more than others, can escape liability for fraud
by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily understand. 51
The court in Frank again focused on public interest considerations and re-
jected the argument that the lawyer was a mere "scrivener" for management.
Instead, it suggested that a lawyer must exercise some measure of independence
in securities matters rather than blindly championing the client's cause. In
addition, the statement that a lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a
statement with regard to securities which he knows to be false suggests that a
lawyer's involvement in a securities matter may be viewed as that of a "par-
ticipant." In view of the comprehensive nature of the federal securities laws
and the breadth of legal assistance required in securities matters, this approach
is realistic and is a practical means of effectuating implementation of the pro-
tections intended by the Securities Acts. Finally, Frank goes one step further
than Benjamin and suggests that there may be circumstances under which a
lawyer passing on an offering circular is required "to run down possible in-
firmities in his client's story of which he has been put on notice."5 2
In the latter part of 1973, the Second Circuit again dealt with the issue of
attorneys' responsibilities under the federal securities laws in the Spectrum
case. 3 Spectrum involved, among other things, the use of an attorney's opinion
letter to sell unregistered securities allegedly in violation of §5 of the Securities
Act. 4 In remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings, Chief
Judge Kaufman, in a unanimous decision, commented on the appropriate rule
of law to be applied by the district judge in assessing the attorney's conduct. In
this regard, Judge Kaufman instructed that the attorney's conduct as an aider
and abettor in a §5 violation should be judged on a negligence standard,"
reasoning that
51 388 F.2d at 489.
52 Id. In Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a
similar suggestion was made, but the court stated that a lawyer need not go so far as to con-
duct an audit. In one of his earlier decisions that grew out of the National Student Mkting.
Corp. fraud, Judge Parker stated, "Lawyers are not free to ignore the commercial substance
of a transaction which could obviously be misleading to stockholders and the investing public.
Courts have not hesitated to pierce through legalistic form in order to circumvent violation of
the securities laws." SEC v. National Student Mkting. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 647 (D.D.C.
1975). See generally United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1972).
In SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied ........ U S ......... (1979),
the Second Circuit affirmed a district court finding that the defendant, a lawyer, had aided
and abetted a violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act by unconditionally, but incorrectly,
representing in an opinion letter to the escrow agent in an "all or none" stock offering that the
minimum number of shares required to be sold before the offering could close had in fact been
sold. The district court found that the lawyer failed to make any inquiries concerning the
number of shares that had been sold. The district court and the court of appeals refused to
permit the lawyer to shut his eyes to what he could plainly see or represent a knowledge he
did not have. See 328 F.2d at 863; 388 F.2d at 488.
53 SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
54 Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits the public offer or sale of securities unless an
effective registration statement is on file with the SEC. Section 3 of the Act exempts various
securities, and § 4 exempts certain transactions from the registration requirements of § 5.
55 489 F.2d at 541. Accord, SEC v. Rega . ....... F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also
SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management




[t]he legal profession plays a unique and pivotal role in the effective imple-
mentation of the securities laws. Questions of compliance with the in-
tricate provisions of these statutes are ever present and the smooth func-
tioning of the securities markets will be seriously disturbed if the public
cannot rely on the expertise proffered by an attorney when he renders an
opinion on such matters....
. . . In the distribution of unregistered securities, the preparation of an
opinion letter is too essential and the reliance of the public too high to
permit due diligence to be cast aside in the name of convenience. The
public trust demands more of its legal advisers than "customary" activities
which prove to be careless.",
Although Spectrum was a § 5 case, its rationale is analogous to cases in-
volving the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws." The critical
factor would appear to be the role of the lawyer in the transaction and the impor-
tance of his opinion or conduct to its consummation.' This rationale is consistent
with the suggestion in Frank that the nature of a lawyer's involvement in a secu-
rities matter may cast him as a "participant" in a transaction. The rationale seems
realistic since, in practice, a lawyer's opinion is the prerequisite to the consum-
mation of a transaction.
The ABA has concluded that a lawyer rendering a legal opinion which is
to be used as the basis for the sale of unregistered securities must have an ade-
quate familiarity with the underlying facts on which the opinion is based.59 The
SEC has posited this same requirement."0 In taking this position, both the ABA
and the SEC recognized the importance of legal opinions in the distribution of
unregistered securities. Moreover, the ABA recognized the far-reaching conse-
quences which an opinion letter can have when it admonishd that a lawyer
"must not be oblivious to the extent to which others may be affected if he is
derelict in fulfilling [his] responsibility [to his client]." 1 This point was im-
plicitly made by the Special Committee on the Lawyer's Role in Securities Trans-
actions 2 when it discussed the key position of lawyers in securities transactions:
In all of these situations, the lawyer's advice is intended as a guide for
action by the client, and what is often desired by the client is a judgment
as to the legal risks of a proposed course of action. Written legal opinions
may also be necessary to comply with legal or negotiated conditions of a
transaction.
6 3
56 489 F.2d at 541-42.
57 See SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, ....... U.S ........ (1979).
58 See 546 F.2d 1044; 515 F.2d 801; SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) ff 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
59 Formal Opinion 335 of the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association, 60 A.B.A.J. 488 (1974).
60 Securities Act Release No. 4445, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721 (February
2, 1962), FED. SEc. L. REP. 91 (1962).
61 See note 59 supra.
62 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report By Special Committee on
Lawyers' Role in Securities Transactions, 33 Bus. LAw. 1343 (Special Issue March 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Special Committee on Lawyers' Role].
63 Id. at 1349.
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The Special Committee also recognized that despite the limited purpose
which a lawyer's opinion may be intended to serve, its presence, and therefore
the lawyer's association with the transaction, could be construed by others to
add an air of legitimacy to the document (e.g., prospectus or registration state-
ment) in which the opinion appears, or the transaction for which it was ren-
dered. In this regard, the Special Committee recommended that a lawyer should
consider including a legend on his opinion expressly stating the limited nature
of the opinion, and cautioning readers not to construe it as implying anything
about any other matter. 4
Recognizing the implication that a lawyer's association with a securities
transaction may lend an appearance of legitimacy to the transaction, former
Commissioner Sommer stated:
It seems to me there are circumstances where the lawyer is on some sort of
notice that there may be an offense against the securities law about to be
committed, and if he touches that in any degree, has his name associated
with it, gives an opinion that assists in the offering, or does anything else,
it seems to me, he may very well be tainted with the whole thing. 5
A lawyer may not permit others to rely on his opinion or representations when
he knows that such opinion or representations have become misleading or are
false." In such circumstances, an affirmative obligation to halt the continued
reliance by others arises. This may be accomplished by withdrawing the opinion
or representations, and, in appropriate circumstances, disclosing the reasons there-
fore. 7 The potential harm to others is too great to permit any other solution,
64 The recommended legend reads: "[The lawyer/law firm] has passed on the validity of
the securities being issued [or other specific matters, e.g., status of litigation] but purchasers of
the securities offered by this Prospectus should not rely on [the lawyer/law firm] with respect
to any other matters." Id. at 1361.
65 Discussion by Participants and Panel, The Registration Process: The Role of the Lawyer
in Disclosure, 33 Bus. LAW. 1329, 1387 (Special Issue March 1978) (comments of A.A.
Sommer, Jr.). See also Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-The
Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1417-18 (Special Issue March 1978); Discussion by
Participants and Panel, Relations with Management and Individual Financial Interests, 33
Bus. LAW. 1227, 1250-51 (Special Issue March 1978) (comments of Professor Robert H.
Mundheim).
66 An opinion rendered for or susceptible to future use may become erroneous at a future
date. Even though an opinion may be dated or contain language which disclaims
responsibility to inform the relying party of changed circumstances, a lawyer should
not knowingly permit the use of a false opinion or an opinion based on erroneous
facts.
Chappell and Cheek, The Development of Law Firm Policies and Procedures Relating to
Securities Matters, II Managing Corporate Disclosure (PLI) 973, 997 (1978).
The Special Committee on Lawyers' Role in Securities Transactions also supported this
position in Guideline Seven to Part III (The Lawyer's Role in Assisting in Preparation of
Registration Statements). Special Committee on Lawyers' Role, supra note 61, at 1361. Cf. id.
at 1355 (Guideline Seven to Part II: Guidelines for Written Legal Opinions in Securities
Transactions).
67 Sonde, supra note 1, at 561; See Fitzgerald v. McFadden, 88 F.2d 639, 644 (2d Cir.
1937) (lawyer acting as agent for his client was held liable to plaintiff where lawyer allowed
plaintiff to act on the basis of a statement made by lawyer, which lawyer knew had become
false). In State v. Rogers, 226 Wisc. 39, 275 N.W. 910 (1937), a lawyer who knew, but did
not disclose to the disinterested management of his corporate-client, that a principal of the
corporation had embezzled funds raised by the corporation in the public sale of securities, was
held to have violated the state blue sky statute aimed at such misconduct. The court ruled
that the lawyer "was in such a position that he could not remain neutral and do nothing." Id.
at 914. The court concluded: "This is not a case where an attorney and officer of a company
was unwittingly led into a situation involving moral and legal consequences. . . . [H]is own
testimony shows that he was aware of the legal and moral implications involved." Id. at 915.
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and the lawyer's obligation to society requires that he act in this way." If a
lawyer were permitted to remain silent, it would amount to a sanctioning of
inaction which assists the perpetration of a wrong on others.69
In National Student Marketing Corp., the lawyers' opinion stated that,
among other things, Interstate had taken all required corporate action necessary
to authorize the merger, and that all action required to be taken by law and by
the merger agreement had been validly taken."0 The court in National Student
Marketing Corp. concluded that "[u]pon receipt of the unsigned comfort letter,
it became clear [to the lawyers] that the merger had been approved by the Inter-
state shareholders on the basis of materially misleading information."'" Despite
this conclusion, the court refused to find liability arising out of the issuance of
the opinion letter.7" It would seem, however, that the lawyers were under an
obligation to withdraw their opinion, as after receipt of the comfort letter, the
opinion was no longer correct. 3 It may be supposed that the opinion added an
appearance of legitimacy to the merger since the Interstate shareholders had
approved the merger on the basis of proxy soliciting materials which included
the merger agreement-which contained express provisions for the exchange
of legal opinions. By refusing to find liability for issuance of the opinion, the
court implicitly sanctioned the issuance of a false legal opinion. The egregious-
ness of this implication cannot be sufficiently emphasized when considering the
thousands of shareholders who were affected by, and the dollar value of, the
merger.
IV. Lawyers' Duty to Disclose to Shareholders
The most difficult question presented in National Student Marketing Corp.,
68 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble states:
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The
fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship
with and function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to
maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.
69 See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (inaction as
a form of substantial assistance when the alleged aider and abettor has a duty to disclose).
See also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
As one commentator explained the SEC's position:
We are saying that when you have facts that suggest to you, as a matter of some
objective level of common sense and judgment, there is something fishy-or when
you know that there is a fraud going on-you have got a duty to do something about
it. And you do not stand by and issue legal opinions or do anything else in that
context to further that conduct.
Discussion by Participants and Panel, The Registration Process: The Role of the Lawyer in
Disclosure, 33 Bus. LAW. 1329, 1384 (Special Issue March 1978) (comments of Theodore
Sonde). See also Seymour, The Choicest Fruit that Grows upon the Tree of English Liberty,
47 N.Y. St. B.J. 83, 121 (1975); Sonde, supra note 1, at 834.
70 The opinion delivered by the lawyers at the closing stated, among other things:
7. The Plan has been duly executed and delivered by Interstate and is a valid and
binding obligation in accordance with its terms and any corporate action by Interstate
required in order to authorize the transactions therein contemplated has been taken.
10. All other actions and-proceedings required by law or the Plan to be taken by
Interstate at or prior to the effective date in connection with the Plan and the
transactions provided for therein have been duly and validly taken.
71 457 F. Supp. at 713.
72 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
73 See notes 64-68 supra and accompanying text.
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and the one which gave rise to the greatest concern in the legal profession, arose
out of the SEC's allegation that the lawyers should have, failing any effort to
halt the merger, informed the SEC of the information contained in the comfort
letter. 4 The lawyers contended that "imposition of such a duty [would] require
lawyers to go beyond their accepted role in securities transactions [and would]
compel them to 'err on the side of conservatism, ...thereby inhibiting clients'
business judgments and candid attorney-client communications.' -7' The SEC's
position was met with strong resistance from the private bar. The suggestion
that lawyers have a duty to "blow the whistle" on their clients was considered
repugnant to the inveterate principle of devotion and loyalty to the client, and
contrary to the obligation to maintain the client's confidences and secrets. Pro-
fessor Homer Kripke criticized this view, characterizing it as preaching a "new
religion" which is "in conflict with an older religion-the old religion of simple-
minded devotion to the client and to the duty to maintain the client's con-
fidences." 76  Others have been less tactful in their criticism.
7 7
The district court's opinion in National Student Marketing Corp. touched
on the sensitive issue raised by the SEC, but fell short of fully addressing or
resolving it. The court concluded that the lawyers should have spoken out at
the closing concerning the materiality of the information contained in the un-
signed comfort letter, and the concomitant requirement of disclosure to and
resolicitation of the Interstate shareholders.7 8 The court suggested rather strongly,
however, that the lawyers had a duty themselves, failing any effort to halt the
merger, to disclose the information to the shareholders. Nonetheless, the court
declined to determine the full extent of the lawyers' obligations, since it found
liability on their failure to take any steps whatsoever to delay the closing pending
disclosure and resolicitation. 7
In order to properly assess whether a lawyer has any obligation to disclose
74 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
75 457 F. Supp. at 713.
76 Kripke, Summary and Conclusions, Proceedings of the ABA National Institute of Ad-
visers to Management, Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, 30 Bus.
LAw. 223, 224-25 (Special Issue March 1975).
77 See Freedman, The SEC in Action, ACROSS THE BOARD (1977).
78 The pertinent passages of the court's opinion were: "But, at the very least, they were
required to speak out at the closing concerning the obvious materiality of the information and
the concomitant requirement that the merger not be closed until the adjustments were disclosed
and approval of the merger was again obtained from the Interstate shareholders." 457 F.
Supp. at 713.
79 The pertinent passages of the district court's opinion raise several questions which must
be analyzed before the conduct of the lawyers can be judged proper or improper:
I. If, as the court concluded, "the attorneys' responsibilities to their corporate client
required them to take steps to ensure that the information would be disclosed to the
shareholders," did the attorneys, in the absence of Interstate's willingness to do so,
have a duty to disclose the information to the shareholders? Moreover, why did "the
attorneys' responsibilities to their corporate client" require "them to take steps neces-
sary to ensure that the information would be disclosed to the shareholders"? Did
"the attorneys' responsibilities to their corporate client" also impose responsibilities to
the client's shareholders? Who was the client?
2. What "fiduciary responsibilities to client shareholders" did the attorneys have, and
did those responsibilities impose a duty on the attorneys to disclose the information
to the shareholders in the absence of Interstate's doing so? Again, who was the
client?
3. How could counsel have fulfilled its "duty to the Interstate shareholders to delay
the closing of the merger pending disclosure and resolicitation with corrected
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information to a corporate-client's shareholders, three issues must be examined.
First, who is the "client" when a lawyer is retained by a corporation? Second,
what responsibilities, if any, does a lawyer retained by a corporation have to the
corporation's shareholders? Finally, if a lawyer retained by a corporation has
responsibilities to the corporation's shareholders, do those responsibilities super-
cede the lawyer's duty to maintain the client's confidences and secrets?
A. Who Is the Client and Responsibility to Shareholders
The CPR identifies the corporate client in EC 5-18 as follows:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director ,officer, employee,
representative, or other person connected with the entity. 0
As a practical matter, this is less than helpful to lawyers who must deal with
the many conflicts which arise in the representation of corporations."' EC 5-18
also provides that "[i]n advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its
interests and his professional judgment should not be influenced by the personal
desires of any person or organization."8 2 Surely the lawyers in National Student
financials"? If counsel's client was the "corporation," why did they have a duty to
the "shareholders"? Did counsel's duty to the shareholders require them to disclose
the information in the absence of Interstate's doing so?
4. If counsel had a duty to see to it that the information was disclosed to the share-
holders, did that duty supercede or give precedence to counsel's responsibility to
maintain the client's confidences and secrets?
The foregoing narrows down to three essential questions:
(1) Who was the "client"?;
(2) What responsibilities, if any, did Interstate's counsel have to the Interstate
shareholders?;
(3) If Interstate's counsel had responsibilities to the shareholders, did those re-
sponsibilities supersede or give precedence to the duty to maintain the client's
confidences and secrets?
These questions are examined in the text accompanying note 80 infra.
80 EC 5-18.
81 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978);
Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer's Role, 34 Bus. LAW. 67 (1978). For
examples of the perplexing conflicts which can arise, see Marsh, Relations with Management
and Individual Financial Interests, 33 Bus. LAW. 1227 (Special Issue -March 1978); Ferren,
The Corporate Lawyer's Obligation to the Public Interest, 33 Bus. LAW. 1253 (Special Issue
March 1978).
In re Carter and Johnson, SEC REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 494, F-1 (Mar. 14, 1979),
the administrative law judge appears to have been of the view that where the question con-
cerns material misstatements or omissions, the board of directors, at the first instance, is the
"client." However, the decision went on to conclude that the professional responsibility of the
lawyers imposed obligations on them which ran to the stockholders and investing public as well.
Id. The clear implication is that in the opinion of the Law Judge, the lawyers would have had
to disclose the alleged misstatements and omissions to the shareholders and investing public if
the board of directors, after being advised, did not. See The Code of Professional Responsibility
of Lawyers Engaged in Securities Law Practice-A Report by the Committee on Counsel
Responsibility and Liability, 30 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1975); see also ABA Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics, Opinion No. 202 (1940).
82 EC 5-18. Pointing to the prohibition against serving two masters who have conflicting
interests, Dean Redlich noted that a lawyer, in the case of a corporate-client, must not con-
fuse the interests of his real client with those of its management. He then added:
I do not mean to suggest that it is easy for the lawyer to define the interest of the
entity, as distinct from those of the director, officer, or employee. But too often the
question isn't even asked. Nothing could be more central to the mission of the
advisor to management than to define the identity and interest of his client.
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Marketing Corp. would have received little guidance from EC 5-18 as to whose
interests to be responsive to once the unsigned comfort letter was received.
Despite the vagueness of EC 5-18, a lawyer must nonetheless determine
whose interests he owes his allegiance to if he is to properly carry out his respon-
sibilities. It is conceivable that EC 5-18 was intentionally written broadly so as
to permit lawyers to determine whose interests they must represent on a situation-
by-situation basis. This would be a reasonable approach considering the innu-
merable conflicts which can and do arise in representing corporate-clients. And
perhaps EC 5-18's language that a lawyer owes his allegiance "to the entity
and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other
person connected with the entity" does not mean that the entity's interests are
necessarily different than the interests of the persons connected with it. It would
not distort the meaning of EC 5-18 to read it as saying, nor would it be unrea-
sonable to suggest, that a lawyer must view the interests of the "entity" on the
basis of the contemplated conduct or transaction which he has been retained
to counsel in, and that those interests may include none, any, or all of the stock-
holders, directors, officers, employees, representatives, or other persons connected
with the entity. Viewed from this perspective, a lawyer would obtain considerable
guidance from EC 5-18. Indeed, it would not be surprising if in many cases the
entity's interests were the same as the interests of those persons connected with it.
To suggest that a lawyer retained by a corporation has responsibilities to
the corporation's shareholders is not inconsistent with EC 5-18. While a cor-
poration's board and management should be accorded considerable leeway in
making "business judgments," in the final analysis, the corporation, and there-
fore its board and management, is accountable to the corporation's shareholders.
Indeed, in some circumstances corporations are not permitted to act without
approval from their shareholders. In these cases, the shareholders effectively
determine what the corporation's interests are based on their own interests. At-
tempts to distinguish the varying interests may often be more confusing than
helpful. For example, in one case where a corporation attempt-d to draw a dis-
tinction between its management's and shareholders' interests, the Court stated:
[I]t must be borne in mind that management does not manage for itself
and that the beneficiaries of its action are the stockholders. Conceptualistic
phrases describing the corporation as an entity separate from its stock-
holders are not useful tools of analysis. They serve only to obscure the fact
that management has duties which run to the benefit ultimately of the
stockholders. . . . There may be many situations in which the corporate
Redlich, Lawryers, the .Temple, and the Market Place, 30 Bus. LAW 65, 68 (Special Issue March
1975).
On a different note, Harold Marsh, Jr. stated that as he perceived the contemporary
principles, a lawyer for a corporation must treat the legally constituted majority of the board
of directors as "the corporation." "Any other rule would result in making it impossible for the
attorney for the corporation to determine to whom he owes his loyalty and would set the at-
torney up as an arbiter of corporate policy asserting the right to overrule the policy decisions
of the board of directors." Marsh, supra note 81, at 1234. Compare Valente v. Pepsico, Inc.,
68 F.R.D. 361 361, 368 (D. Del. 1975) : "[A] corporation is at least in part, the association of its
shareholders."
However, EC 5-18 provides: "A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar
entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee,
representative, or other person connected with the entity."
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entity or its management, or both, have interests adverse to those of some
or all stockholders. But when all is said and done management is not
managing for itself.
8 3
A lawyer cannot ignore this corporation-shareholder relationship when repre-
senting a corporate client. In many instances the shareholders' interests are the
same as the corporation's, and counsel for the corporation therefore has a re-
sponsibility to the shareholders.
Today's corporations accumulate great sums of capital through aggregations
of the investing public's funds. Such activities are attended by the concomitant
requirements of full and fair disclosure to investors. Lawyers who advise cor-
porations of such activities must be cognizant of the aim of the disclosure laws:
protection of those persons whose funds are being sought."' The intent of the
federal securities laws is to protect investors. Effective implementation, however,
of the protections designed by these laws is only possible with the assistance of the
private bar which plays such a large part in most securities matters.8 5 In what
seems to have been a moment of frustration during a panel discussion, former
Commissioner Francis M. Wheat stated:
[T]he public perception is that the lawyer sits back and tries to keep every-
thing bottled up. Quite the opposite, I think the developing ethical re-
sponsibility of business lawyers is to get the problems out and to solve them
in such a way that the public is not injured. That includes primarily the
public as the stockholders in the corporate entity.
That is putting it in a very mushy fashion, but it does seem to me that
we get all mixed up in our underwear when we try to talk about lawyers
having duty to the public and duties to the SEC and duties to everybody.
Our fundamental duty is to our client and that duty, if spelled out cor-
rectly, is going to put a hand [sic] to the problem .... 80
In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,7 the Fifth Circuit held that a corporation's
claim of attorney-client privilege could be subordinated to the corporation's
shareholders' interest in obtaining the information sought
where the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of
acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as
well as those of the corporation and of the public requires that the avail-
ability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders to show
cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance 88
The focus on the corporation-shareholder relationship was the determining cri-
terion for assessing the shareholders' rights against the corporation's claim of
83 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub. nom.
Garner v. First American Life Ins. Co., 401 U.S. 974 '(1971).
84 See text accompanying note 19 supra for discussion of the adviser's role in securities
matters.
85 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
86 Discussion by Participants and Panel, Obligation to the Public Interest, 33 Bus. LAW.
1279, 1284 (Special Issue March 1978) (comments of Francis M. Wheat).
87 430 F.2d 1093.
88 Id. at 1103-04.
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its rights. The Garner rationale suggests that at least in some instances, the cor-
poration's and the shareholders' interests are identical.8 9 In reviewing the district
court's reliance on two English cases which treat the corporation-shareholder
relationship analogous to that between beneficiaries and trustees,9" the court in
Garner said, "Though not binding precedents, these English cases are per-
suasive recognition that there are obligations, however characterized, that run
from corporation to shareholder. . .. ""
These obligations, and the suggestion that there is an overlap between a
corporation's and its shareholders' interests necessarily lead to the inference that
if a lawyer owes his allegiance to a corporation,92 then he also owes his allegiance
to its shareholders.9" It has even been stated that a public company's counsel's
responsibilities are primarily to the company's investors, rather than the com-
pany. 4 However, one need not go so far if the investors' interests are put into
proper perspective.
While the court in National Student Marketing Corp. found no need to
fully determine the extent of the lawyers' obligations to Interstate's shareholders,
it did state that the lawyers had "fiduciary responsibilities to the Interstate
[client] shareholders."9 The court did not give its basis for this statement, but it
would be reasonable to assume that it was the corporation-shareholder relation-
ship which gave rise to it. This appears to be in accord with what the court in
Garner said.
The lawyers in National Student Marketing Corp. argued that they had no
duty to halt the merger or disclose the information contained in the comfort
letter, as that was a business judgment which they properly left for the Inter-
state representatives. The court responded to this argument by stating that it
was not a justification for the lawyers' failure to make a "legal decision. 91 7 This
is consistent with the teachings of the CPR, which instruct that decisions are
properly left to the client if made within the framework of the law.9" However,
it would seem that where the facts and circumstances are sufficiently certain and
the conclusion is clear, as was the case in National Student Marketing Corp.,
there is no sense in applying the "business judgment" restraint on the lawyer.
The decision then becomes a legal one which the lawyer is better equipped than
89 See text accompanying note 80 supra.
90 Gourand v. Edison Gower Bell Tel. Co., 57 L.T.Ch. 498, 56 L.T. 813 (1888); and W.
Dennis & Sons, Ltd. v. West Norfolk Farmers' Manure & Chem. Co., 2 All E.R. 94, 112
L.J.Ch. 239, 169 L.T. 74, 59 TLR 298, 87 Sol. Jo. 211 (1943).
91 430 F.2d at 1102.
92 EC 5-18.
93 See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,894 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Relations with Management and Individual Financial Interests,
33 Bus. LAw. 1239 (Special Issue March 1978) (commentary by Kenneth J. Bialkin) (the
corporate interests refer to the corporation's economic interests for the most part or, in ap-
propriate circumstances, to the shareholder body, or both).
94 See Garrett, SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 223, A-16 (Oct. 17, 1978). See also
Sommer, supra note 15.
95 See text accompanying note 80 supra.
96 457 F. Supp. at 714.
97 Id. at 713-14.
98 EC 7-5, 7-7 and 7-8.
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the client to make. In view of the fiduciary responsibility to the client,99 argu-
ably there exists an obligation on the part of the lawyer to prevent the client
from acting outside the bounds of the law.
The CPR urges a lawyer to express his viewpoint in the decision-making
process. A lawyer should exert his best efforts to assure that all relevant con-
siderations have been examined. However, the CPR cautions "that the decision
to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is
ultimately for the client."'° Against this background, the court's opinion in
National Student Marketing Corp. appears to be in perfect harmony with the
CPR. As a practical -matter, and in keeping with the teachings of the CPR, the
lawyers in National Student "Marketing Corp. should have, as a first step, advised
the Interstate representatives that the merger could not proceed without dis-
closure and resolicitation.' Instead, the lawyers did nothing, which is the
reason that the court found it unnecessary to carry its analysis any further.
However, once the lawyers knew that the merger had been approved by the
shareholders on the basis of false information, their obligations to the share-
holders required them to speak out." 2
This position finds support in the recent decision of In re Carter and
Johnson,"0 3 an SEC administrative proceeding. In that case, the Commission
alleged that lawyers for a publicly held corporation violated, and aided and
abetted violations of, the anti-fraud and reporting provisions of the Exchange
Act. The violations were alleged to have occurred as a result of material mis-
statements and omissions contained in the company-client's press releases, letters
to shareholders, and filings with the Commission. In holding that the lawyers
had violated, and aided and abetted violations of the law as alleged, the adminis-
trative law judge appears to have been of the view that the lawyers had an
obligation to the company's shareholders, as well as investors in general. 1*4 The
law judge did not conclude that the lawyers had a duty, as a matter of law to go
directly to the shareholders or investors." 5 However, from a professional respon-
sibility perspective under the CPR, the law judge concluded that the lawyers
failed to carry out their professional responsibilities with respect to appro-
priate disclosure to all concerned, including stockholders, directors and the
investing public, of the material facts described herein, and thus knowingly
engaged in unethical and improper professional conduct, as charged in
the Order.'00
Finally, the law judge was of the view that as a matter of law, once the
99 See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977);
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976); Hafter v. Farkas, 498 F.2d
587 (2d Cir. 1974); Udall v. Littell, 366 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1007 (1967).
100 EC 7-8.
101 Id. EC 7-7. See State v. Rogers, 226 Wisc. 39, 275 N.W. 910 (1937); Cooney, The
Registration Process: The Role of the Lawyer in Disclosure, 33 Bus. LAw. 1329, 1335-36
(Special Issue March 1978).
102 226 Wisc. 39, 275 N.W. 910.
103 SEc. REG. & L. RFP. (BNA) No. 494, F-i (Mar. 14, 1979).
104 Id.
105 See note 81 supra.
106 SEc. REG. & L. Rp. '(BNA) No. 494, F-i (Mar. 14, 1979).
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lawyers were put on alert that violations were occurring or were about to occur,
they should have embarked on some course of action which would have stopped
or prevented the violation from occurring.07 However, other than indicating that
the lawyers had a duty to the directors, shareholders, and investors, and sug-
gesting that the lawyers should have gone to the board of directors as a first step,
the law judge did not suggest how the lawyers might have stopped or pre-
vented the violations from occurring.
B. Lawyers' Duty to Reveal Information
The SEC's position that the lawyers in National Student Marketing Corp.
had a duty to disclose the information contained in the unsigned comfort letter
finds support in the CPR. Foremost in this regard is DR 7-102(B) (1), which
provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rec-
tify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall
reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the
information is protected as a privileged communication.
In addition, several other provisions of the CPR support the SEC's position and
require a lawyer to disclose information ."' The disclosure requirement usually
arises in situations involving the client's dishonest or fraudulent conduct, mis-
representation or otherwise illegal conduct. The duty to disclose is usually
accompanied by a duty to withdraw from the representation.
Although DR 7-102(B) (1) excepts privileged communications from the
duty to reveal, if a client's contemplated conduct amounts to an intent to commit
a "crime," DR 4-101 (C) (3) suggests that the information necessary to prevent
its commission may be revealed without regard for whether the information
is privileged. 9 Also, a lawyer must consult applicable statutory and case
law to determine what disclosure requirements, if any, exist since the CPR
prohibits a lawyer from concealing or knowingly failing "to disclose that which
107 Id.
108 The CPR provides that a lawyer: may not "[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," DR 1-102 (A) (4); must withdraw from the representation
if "[hie knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a
Disciplinary Rule," DR 2-110(B)(2); may withdraw from the representation if his client
"[p~ersonally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct," DR 2-110(0) (1) (b); may withdraw
if "[h)is continued employment is likely to result in a violation of a Disciplinary Rule," DR
2-110 (C) (2); may reveal "[c]onfidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules
or required by law or court order," DR 4-01 (C) (2) ; may reveal "[t]he intention of his client
to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime," DR 4-101'(C) (3); may
"[r]efuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful, even though there is
some support for an argument that the conduct is legal," DR 7-101 (B) (2); shall not "[c]on-
ceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal," DR 7-102(A) (3) ;
shall not "[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact," DR 7-102 (A) (5); shall not
"[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent,"
DR 7-102(A)(7); and shall not "[klnowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct
contrary to a Disciplinary Rule," DR 7-102(a) (8).
109 DR 4-101(()'(3) provides: "A lawyer may reveal the intention of his client to commit
a' crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."
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he is required by law to reveal""' and permits a lawyer to reveal "[c]onfidences
or secrets when . . . required by law. . . .""' A lawyer's noncompliance with
the requirements of the CPR, however, will not necessarily result in civil liability.
The CPR was not intended to establish standards for civil liability for profes-
sional misconduct." 2 However, there is authority" 3 for the proposition that the
standards set by the accounting profession should be the determining factor in
judging whether accountants have fulfilled their responsibilities under the federal
securities laws, and this proposition may well be applicable to lawyers and the
CPR." 4 Thus, the CPR may be an important consideration in determining civil
liability."'
The argument against the duty to disclose is founded upon the fear that
imposition of such a duty would greatly damage the confidential relationship
enjoyed by lawyers with their clients. The damage would result from clients'
apprehension of revealing information to their lawyers, which in turn would
impede effective legal representation and in the end would be detrimental to
the administration of justice. As Commissioner Roberta S. Karmel put it several
years before joining the Commission:
Holding attorneys to the high ethical standards suggested in the National
Student Marketing complaint has an easy public interest appeal, which is
difficult to criticize. Nevertheless, the idea that an attorney has a duty to
the SEC or the public to investigate the information he receives from his
clients in connection with an SEC registration statement or other filing
and disclose any falsities discovered could prove inimical to existing attor-
ney-client relationships." 6
110 DR 7-102(A) (3).
111 DR 4-101 (0)(2).
112 ABA CASE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble. See Herman v. Acheson, 108
F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715 (D.C.Cir. 1953).
E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 377 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (the CPR has no
statutory force). However, in Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225,
227 n.2 '(2d Cir. 1977), the court of appeals stated that the CPR '"is recognized by both state
and federal courts within this circuit as providing appropriate guidelines for proper profes-
sional behavior" (citing NCK Organization Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 129 n.2 (2d Cir.
1976)).
113 SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
114 Id.
115 While analysis of a lawyer's responsibility to reveal information under the Canons,
Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules of the CPR may itself be difficult and involved,
the most difficult task confronting a lawyer is the task of shaping the facts involved and giving
clear definition to what he perceives to be the problem. A lawyer's decision to reveal informa-
tion, if not firmly founded, will lead to a transgression of the CPR, as "the authority to make
decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, such
decisions are binding on his lawyer." EC 7-7. Moreover, an unfounded decision to reveal in-
formation may injure the client which could constitute a violation of DR 7-101 (A) (3)'s ex-
press prohibition from intentionally prejudicing or damaging a client during the professional
relationship, unless required by DR 7-102 (B). The difficulty of the task confronting the lawyer
is well stated in the CPR:
In fulfilling his professional responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily assumes various roles
that require the performance of many difficult tasks. Not every situation which he
may encounter can be foreseen, but fundamental ethical principles are always
present to guide him. Within the framework of these principles, a lawyer must with
courage and foresight be able and ready to shape the body of the law to the ever-
changing relationships of society.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, Preamble.
116 Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 1153, 1159-60 (1972).
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Hopefully, the legitimate public interest in preserving the confidential rela-
tionship between attorney and client will be regarded as more important
than the SEC's apparent intention of enlisting the aid of private practitioners
to implement enforcement of the securities laws.
11 7
Others have echoed concerns similar to those of Commissioner Karmel. In a
1975 Statement of Policy,1 8 the House of Delegates of the ABA adopted the
recommendation of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
which concluded:
We do not believe that the policy of disclosure as embodied in the SEC
laws warrants an exception to the basic confidentiality of the attorney-client
relationship. Such exceptions have to date been carefully reserved by the
CPR for far more critical and limited situations. The statutes adminis:ered
by the SEC give it no power to require disclosure by lawyers concerning
their clients beyond what is provided in the CPR."',
However, the only argument of substance is the concern for the possible
damage to the attorney-client relationship. As for the other arguments, the
courts, the Commission, and the ABA have repeatedly recognized that lawyers
involved in the disclosure process cannot take client representations on blind
faith, but rather must take some steps, short of an audit, to satisfy themselves
that the information they receive from their clients is accurate." The United
States Supreme Court, in J. I. Case v. Borak,"' as well as several lower courts
and the Commission, has recognized that the private bar plays an important
role in the effective implementation of the disclosure laws in securities matters.
The public and the Commission necessarily rely on this assistance as a means
of implementing the protections the securities laws were intended to effect.122
Professor Wigmore laconically stated the real problem: "In order to promote
freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension of com-
pelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; hence the law must
prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent."' 23
117 Id. at 116+.
118 61 A.B.A. J. 1085 (1975).
119 ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Recommendation 31 Bus.
LAw. 544, 547 (1975).
120 SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Spectrum,
489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970); SEC v.
Frank, 388 F.2d 486 '(2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); SEC v. National Student Mkting. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641
(D.D.C. 1975); Escott v. BarChris 'Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); In re
Emanuel Fields, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,407 (1973); Formal Opinion 335 of the
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, 60
A.B.A. J. 488 (1974); Securities Act Release No. 4445, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6721 (Feb. 2, 1962), FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ........ (1962); Special Committee on
Lawyers' Role, supra note 61.
121 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
122 515 F.2d 801; 489 F.2d 535; 388 F.2d 486; 328 F.2d 854; In re Arthur Andersen &
Co., FED. SeC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,407 *(1973).




An analysis of the duty to reveal under DR 7-102(B) (1) requires careful
examination of several significant questions, the two most difficult of which are:
Who is the client and when are communications privileged and thereby ex-
cepted from the duty to reveal? The first question has already been dealt
with, 2  and the second question will be examined after a brief review of what
"clearly establishing," "fraud," and "person or tribunal" are intended to mean
in the context which they are used in DR 7-102(B) (1).
1. "Clearly Establishing"
DR 7-102 (B) (1) provides that the duty to reveal arises only when a lawyer
receives information "clearly establishing" that his client has perpetrated a
fraud in the course of the representation. In 1975 the ABA House of Delegates
addressed this point:
In appropriate circumstances, a lawyer may be permitted or required by
the Disciplinary Rules under the CPR to resign his engagement if his advice
concerning disclosures is disregarded by the client and, if the conduct of a
client clearly establishes his prospective commission of a crime or the past or
prospective perpetration of a fraud in the course of the lawyer's represen-
tation, even to make the disclosure himself. However, the lawyer has neither
the obligation nor the right to make disclosure when any reasonable doubt
exists concerning the client's obligation of disclosure, i.e., the client's failure
to meet his obligation is not clearly established, except to the extent that
the lawyer should consider appropriate action, as required or permitted by
the CPR, in cases where the lawyer's opinion is expected to be relied on by
third parties and the opinion is discovered to be not correct, whether because
it is based on erroneous information or otherwise.'25
This statement finds some support in ABA Opinion 314, which provides
that a lawyer must disclose the confidences of his client if "the facts in the attor-
ney's possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be com-
mitted."'2 6 However, it must be noted that ABA Opinion 314 deals with a client's
intent to commit a crime, which is a matter specifically addressed in DR 4-101
(C) (3). Although DR 7-102 (B) (1) expressly requires that the information
received by the lawyer "clearly establish" the perpetration of a fraud, DR 4-101
(C) (3) has no such express standard. The authority of the House of Delegates'
adoption of a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for DR 7-102(B) (1) in
the face of the express "clearly establishing" standard must be seriously ques-
tioned. Moreover, the House of Delegates provided no support for its limitation
on the duty of disclosure to situations where the lawyer has issued an opinion
which "is expected to be relied on by third parties and the opinion is discovered
to be not correct." No support can be found for this limitation in the CPR.
However, to the extent that a "fraud" may constitute a crime, the House of
Delegates would be correct in holding a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
124 See text accompanying note 80 supra.
125 House of Delegates of the ABA, Statement of Policy, 61 A.B.A.J. 1085 (1975) (adopt-
ing recommendation of ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, 31 Bus. LAw.
544, 545 (1975)).
126 See DR, 4-101(C)'(3) n.16 (emphasis added).
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applicable under DR 4-101 (C) (3). But this would not resolve the duty to dis-
close under the "clearly establishing" standard of DR 7-102 (B) (1).
2. "Fraud"
The question of what constitutes "fraud" under DR 7-102(B) (1) must be
considered in assessing the duty to reveal. ABA Formal Opinion 341, issued in
1975, adopts the common law view of fraud and provides that it presupposes
scienter or the intent to deceive. 2 ABA Canon of Professional Ethics No. 41,
the precursor of DR 7-102(B) (1), required disclosure of fraud and deception.12
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,129 the Supreme Court, after an extensive anal-
ysis of the interrelationships of the Securities Acts, held that the terms "manipu-
lative" and "deceptive" as used in § 10(b) of the Exchange Act presupposed
scienter. The Court defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud"13 and left open the question of whether reck-
lessness, in some circumstances, constitutes scienter."' Whether Hochfelder's
definition of scienter applies to ABA Formal Opinion 341, and therefore to DR
7-102(B) (1), is an open question. In a recent decision, SEC v. S. Hayward
Wills,".2 Judge Gessell suggested that the Hochfelder scienter requirements is
limited to a showing of deceit which is expressly stated in § 10(b) and may not
apply to a showing of fraud which is expressly stated in § 17(a) of the Securities
Act.;"' However, the Supreme Court's statement in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. Daniel34 that the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Acts im-
pose "indefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations,"'' suggests that violations
of the anti-fraud provisions, and therefore the commission of fraud under the
securities laws, will be very difficult to prove.
Application of the principles laid down by the courts to the CPR would
clarify significantly the responsibilities of lawyers under the CPR. In this regard,
the absence of the word deception in DR 7-102(B) (1), as compared to its pres-
127 ABA Formal Opinion 341; See Ferren, The Corporate Lawyer's Obligation to the
Public Interest, 33 Bus. LAW 1253, 1260 n.13 (Special Issue March 1978).
128 ABA CANONS O PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS No. 41 provided:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which has
unjustly imposed upon a court or a party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first,
by advising his client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly
gained, he should promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so that they
may take appropriate steps.
129 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
130 Id. at 193-94 n.12.
131 It must be emphasized that Hochfelder's holding that scienter is required in order to
state a cause of action under § 10(b) applies to private damage actions. The question
"whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5" was left open by the Supreme Court. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.13. The lower courts
have differed on this issue in their decisions since Hochfelder. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co.,
590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. American
Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. pending, No. 78-956 (filed December 15, 1978); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d
8 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 439 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. La. 1977).
132 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1978). See also note 131 supra.
133 In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court suggested that the language of § 17(a) may be
broader than the language of § 10(b) and therefore may not require a showing of scienter to
prove a violation. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212-13 & n. 32.




ence in ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 41, suggests that something less
than scienter, as defined in Hochfelder, constitutes fraud under DR 7-102 (B) (1).
However, the reference to deceit in ABA Formal Opinion 341 implies that proof
of scienter is required. Moreover, in light of Daniel, it may be quite difficult
to prove fraud under the federal securities laws, which would limit the duty to
reveal under DR 7-102(B) (1) to the more egregious situations.
Finally, the question of what constitutes fraud may be entirely different in
the context of SEC administrative proceedings. In this regard, the Commission
has followed the standard of willfulness as set forth in Tager v. SEC, which states:
It has been uniformly held that "willfully" in this context means intentionally
committing the act which constitutes the violation. There is no requirement
that the actor be aware that he is violating the Rules or Act.
13 6
Indeed, the Commission has rejected the applicability of Hochfelder to its
administrative proceedings.'37 The result of this is that it leaves lawyers in a
quandary. If a finding of "fraud" under DR 7-102(B) (1) requires proof of
scienter as defined in Hochfelder, then knowledge that a violation is being com-
mitted would seem to be essential. However, in SEC administrative proceedings
applying the Tager standard, knowledge whether the conduct in question vio-
lates the law is not essential to a lawyer's assessment of his responsibility to speak
out. Consequently, the SEC has, if Hochfelder is applicable to the determination
of what constitutes "fraud" under the CPR, imposed a standard higher than
is required under the CPR. This means that the SEC could, in a given situa-
tion, be requiring lawyers to violate the CPR by imposing on them a duty to
speak out when the conduct in question amounts to fraud under the Tager test,
but not under Hochfelder. This result is untenable, especially in view of the
fact that Commission's Office of the General Counsel argued that the CPR
should be determinative in judging lawyers' conduct in SEC administrative
proceedings.
3. "Person or Tribunal"
DR 7-102(B) (1)'s duty to reveal is limited to revealing the fraud to the
affected "person!' or "tribunal." The CPR defines "person" to include "a cor-
poration, an association, a trust, a partnership, and any other organization or
legal entity."' 8  "Tribunal" includes "all courts and all other adjudicatory
bodies."' 39 An ABA Committee has interpreted "tribunal" to exclude a govern-
mental agency except in the context of a hearing or proceeding. 4
136 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965); In re Carter and Johnson, SEC. REo. L. REP. (BNA)
No. 494, F-1 (Mar. 14, 1979).
137 Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 1976), rehearing denied, 551
F.2d 915 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); In re Carter and Johnson, SEC. REoG.
& L. REP. (BNA) (No. 494 F-i, Mar. 14, 1979); FAI Investment Analysts, Inc., Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 13695 (June 29, 1977), appeal pending, No. 77-2415 (5th
Cir.)
138 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Definition No. 3.
139 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Definition No. 6.
140 The Code of Professional Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securities Law Practice
-A Report by the Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, 30 Bus. LAw. 1289,
1299 (1975) ; Ferren, supra note 81, at 1260.
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As an administrative agency, the SEC would likely be included within the
definition of "person" as an "organization or legal entity." Moreover, the duty
to reveal to the SEC arguably exists by virtue of the SEC's function as a servant
of and conduit for the investing public, which includes the persons affected by a
securities fraud. Finally, DR 1-103 (A) requires a lawyer to report unprivileged
knowledge of, among other things, a lawyer's conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 4' to a tribunal or other authority empowered
to investigate or act upon such conduct. Arguably, this would require a lawyer
to report his own conduct to the SEC,142 since the SEC has the authority to
investigate and act upon the described conduct.
C. Privileged Communications
Privileged communications are expressly excepted from DR 7-102(B) (1)'s
revelation requirement. ABA Formal Opinion 341 defined "privileged com-
munication" as including "those confidences and secrets that are required to be
preserved by DR 4-101."'' DR 4-101 (B) (1) prohibits a lawyer from reveal-
ing his client's "confidences"' or "secrets."' 44 The ethical prohibition is broader
than the prohibitions of the attorney-client privilege, 45 and "exists without
regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the
knowledge."' 4 8 As the Seventh Circuit recently instructed: "To the extent evi-
dentiary, procedural, or agency rules are generally instructive, we should accept
their guidance. However, those rules should not strictly control the application
of ethical principles."'
4'
Prior to January 1, 1970, the effective date of the CPR, the ABA appar-
ently had given the lawyer's duty to maintain his client's confidences priority
over the duty to reveal the client's intention to commit a crime and the actual
commission of fraud, deception or perjury during the course of the represen-
tation.' When the CPR first became effective in 1970, DR 7-102(B) (1)'s
exception for privileged communications did not exist. The exception was added
141 DR 1-103(A) (4).
142 17 CFR 201.2(e) (1978) gives the Commission authority to discipline professionals
who practice before it for, among other things, violations of the provisions of the Securities
Acts. Section 20 of the Securities Act and § 21 of the Exchange Act give the Commission and
its staff the authority to investigate possible violations of the provisions of the Securities Acts.
Since a lawyer's conduct involving fraud, deceit or misrepresentation can violate the anti-
fraud provisions of the Securities Acts, the SEC is an "authority empowered to investigate or
act upon such conduct" within the meaning of DR 1-103(A).
143 ABA Formal Opinion 341 (1975).
144 DR 4-101 (A) provides:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional re-
lationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
145 EC 4-4; First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978).
146 EC 4-4.
147 584 F.2d 201.
148 For a detailed analysis, see Ferren, supra note 80, at 1261-66. See also Redlich, supra
note 82, at 70.
Generally, the pre-Code obligations to disclose a client's fraud, deception or perjury were
either limited expressly by the Canons, or narrowed by later opinions of the ABA. See ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETnics Nos. 29 '(duty to reveal client's commission of perjury),
37 (duty to preserve client's confidences, except announced intention to commit a crime), and
41 (duty to reveal client's fraud or deception). See also ABA Formal Opinions 23 (1930),
155 (1936), 156 (1936), 268 (1945) and 341 (1975).
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by amendment in 1974, apparently because of a concern that without it there
might be a conflict with state law obligations to protect privileged communica-
tions. "'49 In a 1975 Statement of Policy, 5 ' the House of Delegates of the ABA
adopted the recommendation of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Busi-
ness Law, which concluded:
This vital confidentiality of consultation and advice [between lawyer and
client] would be destroyed or seriously impaired if it is accepted as a gen-
eral principle that lawyers must inform the SEC or others regarding confi-
dential information received by lawyers from their clients even though such
action would not be permitted or required by the CPR. Any such compelled
disclosure would seriously and adversely affect ... the ability of lawyers as
advocates to represent and defend their clients' interests.
In light of the foregoing considerations, it must be recognized that a lawyer
cannot, consistently with his essential role as legal adviser, be regarded as
a source of information concerning possible wrong-doing by clients. Ac-
cordingly, any principle of law which, except as permitted or required by
the CPR, permits or obliges a lawyer to disclose to the SEC otherwise con-
fidential information, should be established only by statute after full and
careful consideration of the public interests involved, and should be resisted
unless clearly mandated by law.' 5 '
The Special Committee of the Bar of the City of New York on the Lawyer's
Role in Securities Transactions came to the same conclusion. 5 '
The attorney-client privilege is an inveterate principle in the law. It first
arose during the reign of Elizabeth I in "consideration for the oath and the
honor of the attorney rather than for the apprehension of his client."' 52 By the
mid-1800's, the privilege was recognized as belonging to the client, and included
"communications made, first, during any other litigation, next, during a con-
troversy but not yet looking to litigation; and, lastly, in any consultation for legal
advice, wholly irrespective of litigation or even of controversy."'"
The policy underlying the privilege is the promotion of freedom of con-
sultation. This is accomplished through elimination of the apprehension of dis-
closure without consent.'5 " However, the privilege applies only to confidential
149 ABA National Institute, Advisers to Management, 30 Bus. LAw. 13, 20 '(Special Issue
March 1975) (remarks of Lewis H. Van Dusen, Jr.); Lorne, The Corporate and Securities
Adviser, The Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MiOH. L. REv. 425, 444 (1978).
150 61 A.B.A. J. 1079, 1085 (1975).
151 ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Report to House of Delegates,
31 Bus. LAw. 544 (1975).
152 Special Committee on Lawyer's Role, supra note 62, at 1362:
The Committee agrees, however, with the ABA position that the circumstances
in which the lawyer has aa affirmative obligation under the CPR to disclose con-
fidences or secrets of the client are quite properly rare.
The Committee believes that imposition of affirmative duties to disclose con-
fidences or secrets to third parties in situations beyond those required by the CPR-
on pain of professional discipline-is an exceedingly serious step which should be
taken only if clearly mandated by law.
153 8 J. WIGMORE, EvMENCE § 2290, at 542 (J. McNaughton. rev. ed. 1961); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929
(1963).
154 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2290, at 545 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
155 Id. "The evidentiary privilege and the ethical duty not to disclose confidences both
arise from the need to encourage clients to disclose all possibly pertinent information to their
attorneys, and both protect only the confidential information disclosed." E.F. Hutton & Co. v.
Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 394 '(S.D. Tex. 1969) (citations omitted).
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communications between the client and his legal adviser."'6
The attorney-client privilege is applicable to corporations.' Since a cor-
poration can speak only through its agents, representatives, and employees, the
corporation's privilege is applicable to confidential communications (written
and oral) by such persons. However, the courts are divided as to which of these
persons' communications are covered by the corporation's privilege.'5 8
In the first case, City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,59 a
"ccontrol group" test was applied. Under the control group test, a communication
is subject to the corporation's attorney-client privilege if the employee making it
"is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about
any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or
if he is an authorized member of a body or group which has that authority."1 60
The rationale behind this test is that an employee in such a position "personifies"
the corporation when he communicates with the lawyer. 6 ' However, the em-
ployee's authority to participate in the decision concerning the corporate action
must be actual, not apparent.'
The second test came in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker. 6'
Under the Harper & Row test, "an employee of a corporation, though not a
member of its control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so
that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the
employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the cor-
poration and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought
by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by
the employee of the duties of his employment."'' However, the Court in Harper
& Row cautiously pointed out that the employee it was describing does not
include an employee who fortuitously observes an event that could give rise to
corporate liability. 65 Such an employee was considered to resemble a bystander,
156 The attorney-client privilege exists where the following four conditions are found:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be dis-
closed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered;
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communica-
tions must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.
See note 153 supra.
157 United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915); Diversified Indus.
Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc); United States v. Bartlett,
449 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1971); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 974 *(1971); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975).
158 See 572 F.2d at 606; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.
1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). Compare City of Philadelphia
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition
denied sub nom., General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 943 (1963).
159 210 F.Supp. 483.
160 Id. at 485.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 423 F.2d 487.
164 Id. at 491-92.
165 Id. at 491.
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and therefore not within the intendment of the privilege.
Finally, a modified Harper & Row test was announced by the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Merwdeth' Under Diversified, the priv-
ilege applies
if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the direction
of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the cor-
poration could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communi-
cation is within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the
communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the
corporate structure, need to know its contents. 1
67
The reason for the modification was the fear that under the control group test
corporations would funnel corporate communications through their lawyers
and thereby shield information from the discovery process. "8 Also, under
Diversified, the corporation must show that the employee's communication meets
all of the listed criteria before the privilege will be sustained.
Thus, counsel may conclude that although a communication would other-
wise be confidential, the position of the communicant in the corporation is con-
trolling. Unfortunately, counsel may not be in a position to determine which
communicants' communications are privileged and which are not because of the
different tests applied.169 However, counsel should be aware that in most in-
stances not all employee communications will be privileged.
Although the authorities agree that a corporation is entitled to a claim of
attorney-client privilege, there is considerable authority for the proposition that
the privilege should be construed narrowly and strictly. 7 ' The reason for this
construction is the realization that application of the privilege detracts from full
disclosure and therefore is detrimental to the administration of justice. Conse-
quently, the injury to the attorney-client relationship which would follow from
disclosure must outweigh the benefit society would gain from disclosure.' 7'
Therefore, application of the privilege must be considered on an ad hoc basis. 2
The attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications concerning
the prospective commission of a crime or fraud. 73 There is no societal benefit
166 See note 158 supra.
167 572 F.2d at 609.
168 Id.
169 This problem is made even more difficult by reason of the liberal venue provisons of the
Securities Acts. Counsel may be unable to predict where suit will be brought, and therefore,
which test will be applied.
170 572 F.2d at 612; 320 F.2d at 323; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950); See 8 J. WIGMORE § 2291, at 545 (J. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
171 8 J. WIGMORE § 2285, at 527 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); 320 F.2d at 323.
172 320 F.2d at 324.
173 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d at 1103. See United States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655
(7th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1972); Hyde Constr. Co.
v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Bartlett, 449 F.2d 700 '(8th
Cir. 1971).
It has even been suggested that communications concerning prospective action of ques-




to be gained from protection of such communications.1 4 What is involved here
is a balancing of interests-society's interest in promoting full disclosure to legal
advisers, and thereby promoting effective legal representation, balanced against
society's interest in furthering the administration of justice through disclosure
of the entire truth. A recent California Supreme Court decision 1 75 held that a
therapist who determines, or who should have determined under applicable
professional standards, that a patient poses a serious threat of violence to others
has a "duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that
danger." '17 6 There was no exception to the therapist-patient privilege for con-
templated conduct of the kind involved, yet the court concluded that the ther-
apist had an affirmative duty to protect the foreseeable victim. To be sure, the
case involved possible physical injury to a person, but the decision reached by
the court makes certain the possibility that in some circumstances, the adverse
effect to society, or at least to the foreseeable victims, can outweigh the policy
underlying the privilege. The adverse effects need not be limited to physical
injuries. Judge Friendly's statement in Benjamin bears repetition here: "In our
complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be
instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the
crowbar."' 77
In United States v. Bartlett, 78 the chief executive officer of an issuer, having
been convicted of fraud in connection with the sale of unregistered securities
(§ 17(a) of the Securities Act), wire fraud and mail fraud, appealed the con-
viction contending that, among other things, the trial court's admission of the
issuer's counsel's testimony concerning certain communications violated the
attorney-client privilege and therefore constituted prejudicial error. While the
court concluded that there was no attorney-client relationship established and
the communications were not confidential, it also held that even if the elements
necessary to establish the privilege were present, the privilege was lost under the
crime-fraud exception. 9 Bartlett implies that fraud under § 17(a) comes within
the strictures of the crime-fraud exception to the privilege. Since a showing of
fraud under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is at least as difficult as a showing under
§ 17(a),8' § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 fraud also comes within the crime-fraud
exception. This logic should extend to the other anti-fraud provisions of the
Exchange Act. 8 ' Lawyers may therefore be able to rely on the law as it has
developed under the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Acts to determine
whether a client's communication, albeit confidential, comes under the crime-
fraud exception to the privilege, and therefore is not privileged.
174 However, communications concerning past wrongdoings are privileged. See J. WioMoRZ
§ 2298, at 573 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
175 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976), vacating 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
176 Id. at 429, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
177 See note 45 supra.
178 See note 157 supra.
179 Id. at 704.
180 See text accompanying note 128 supra.




In United States v. Tellier,"8' the Second Circuit concluded that a confi-
dential communication is not privileged if not intended to be confidential. "Thus
it is well established that communications between an attorney and his client,
though made privately, are not privileged if it was understood that the informa-
tion communicated in the conversation was to be conveyed to others."'83 More-
over, although the communications at issue in Tellier were never in fact conveyed
to anyone else, the court concluded that the privilege did not apply because the
client did not intend that the communications be kept confidential in the first
place.184 The holding in Tellier implies that client communications to counsel
in connection with the preparation of documents or statements which the client
knows may include such communications, or parts thereof, and which the client
intends to or expects will be communicated to others, albeit confidential when
made, are not privileged. Therefore, in many instances, client communications
to counsel in connection with the preparation of filings with the Commission
and reports to shareholders will not be privileged.
V. Conclusion
Over the past several decades, the dynamics of business and business struc-
tures have changed dramatically. During the course of these changes, business
increasingly reached out to the public, seeking capital needed to meet the grow-
ing demands of and new opportunities in society. Coincidentally, regulation of
business expanded to a point where today virtually every phase of business is
touched by some form of regulation.
As regulation grew, lawyers became increasingly involved in the affairs of
business. Soon, lawyers found themselves participating in the deliberations over
most significant corporate considerations. Eventually, the considerations which
the lawyers were uniquely qualified to advise on became so significant that their
advice often was a controlling factor. Today, lawyers play an indispensable
and essential role in the affairs of corporations. In this regard, the advice of
lawyers often determines whether any particular transaction will occur, and if
it does, then with whom, at what price, and where it will occur.
The federal securities laws were enacted to protect the investing public.
These laws are so complex, and the scheme by which their protections are in-
tended to be effected is of such a design, that effective implementation of. the
ends sought to be achieved by the laws requires the assistance of the private bar.
Such assistance is a necessary supplement to governmental action, and because
of the legal adviser's high degree of involvement in the securities affairs of his
corporate-client, he is in a uniquely strategic position to lend such assistance.
In serving a corporate-client, a lawyer must be acutely cognizant of the
chent's responsibilities to its shareholders. In this regard, the shareholders often
have the same interests as the corporate-client, and the lawyers service to one
will effectively give service to the other. However, there are circumstances when
the varying interests are not easily reconcilable, and it is at that point when the
182 255 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958).
183 Id. at 447 (citations omitted).
184 Id.
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lawyer-adviser is faced with his most difficult decisions. Since the adviser's
loyalty must be to his corporate-client, an examination of what embodies such
a client leads to the realization that shareholders also have a significant interest
to be protected by the adviser. This interest is the well-being of the corporation,
and thus the protection of shareholder investments. Consequently, the lawyer
may find himself concerned with multiple interests.
While the CPR attempts to provide some guidance in this area, in practice
it is of little help. The obligations which corporations have to their shareholders
must, to some degree, be shouldered by the lawyer-adviser who counsels the
corporations. There may even be circumstances so serious or so urgent that the
lawyer may have to take some action on his own so as not to frustrate the ends
sought to be achieved by the law. This is a concept developing in the law which
has given rise to a great deal of concern in the legal profession.
